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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Budget imbalances are pervasive in developing countries. The ﬁscal author-
ities of India have been no exception to this rule, and India has had a long
history of running budget deﬁcits. Indeed, the ongoing need for ﬁscal consol-
idation and the achievement of ﬁscal sustainability continues to be the key
macroeconomic issue confronting India. India’s ﬁscal record is of special in-
terest, as unlike many developing countries, its large budget deﬁcits have not
been accompanied by adverse macroeconomic developments, such as periods
of high inﬂation or negative growth in per capita income.
By the end of the 1980s the deterioration in Indian ﬁscal accounts, ac-
companied by a sharp worsening of the external current account deﬁcit, en-
gendered a rapid accumulation of public and external debt.1 These internal
and external imbalances resulted in the Indian economy being highly vulner-
able to domestic and external macroeconomic shocks. The ensuing balance
of payments crisis of 1991 resulted in the near-exhaustion of India’s foreign
exchange reserves, largely caused by the withdrawal of foreign-currency de-
posits by nonresident Indians. While the trigger for the crisis lay in domestic
political diﬃculties and the Persian Gulf war, concern over the sustainability
of Indian ﬁscal policy, due to rising debt and debt servicing, was the root
cause of the crisis (see Chopra et al. (1995) for details). Since the crisis of
1In 1990/91 the central government’s budget deﬁcit was over 8 percent of India’s gross
domestic product (Figure 1). During the 1980s the deﬁcit averaged about 7 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP), and the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 49 to
67 percent.An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 2
the early 1990s, the government has undertaken ﬁscal reforms in order to put
ﬁscal policies on a sustainable path..
In this paper, we conduct a formal test of whether India’s ﬁscal policy
stance is sustainable, by examining if India has breached its intertemporal
budget constraint. The intertemporal budget constraint test of the sustain-
ability of ﬁscal policy asks whether the past behaviour of revenue, expendi-
ture and the ﬁscal deﬁcit could be continued indeﬁnitely without prompting
an adverse response from lenders. As such, the question of sustainability of
the debt involves considerations of whether Ponzi ﬁnancing (i.e., the funding
of interest payments from the proceeds of new debt issues) has been used as
a debt management strategy. In the absence of non-distortionary taxation,
a dynamically eﬃcient economy requires that Ponzi ﬁnancing not be used
(Wilcox 1989).2 Our approach is to analyse the time series properties of the
ﬁscal policies of Indian central governments dating back to the early 1950s,
to see whether Ponzi ﬁnancing arrangements have been used. This enables
us to draw conclusions about the sustainability of Indian ﬁscal policy, and
to evaluate the need for reforms of the type introduced in 1991.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we formally deﬁne what
2Even if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, Ponzi ﬁnancing is feasible under uncer-
tainty as long as the competitive equilibrium allocation of resources is not Pareto eﬃcient
(Blanchard and Weil 1992). Current ﬁscal policies in India have been sustained by a
favourable interest rate-growth rate diﬀerential. Since India’s nominal GDP growth rate
has typically exceeded the average nominal interest rate on government debt, due to the
impact of ﬁnancial repression on borrowing costs and access to concessional external bor-
rowing, the government was for many years able to borrow to service the existing debt
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we mean by a sustainable ﬁscal policy. The econometric methodology used to
test for sustainability is outlined in section 3 and this is followed, in section
4, by a description of the data. The results from the sustainability tests are
outlined in section 5 and a concluding section follows.
2 Sustainability Criteria
For simplicity, we assume that budget deﬁcits are ﬁnanced using bonds with a
maturity of one period. This means that in any single period, the government
faces the following budget constraint:
Gt +( 1+rt)Bt−1 = Rt + Bt, (1)
where G is government outlays (i.e., consumption plus transfer payments), r
is the one-period real rate of interest, R is government revenue and B is the
stock of debt.














To derive the implications of equation (2) for the government’s conduct
of ﬁscal policy, we make two assumptions (see Flavin and Hamilton 1986
and Haug 1995). The ﬁrst is that the real interest rate is stationary with an
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does not grow, on average, at a rate in excess of the average rate of interest.
These two assumptions imply that,
lim
s→∞(1 + r)
−sBt+s =0 . (3)
Equation (3) states that the debt stock, when measured in present value
terms, vanishes in the limit. By deﬁnition, this excludes Ponzi ﬁnancing. It
also implies that the government does not have the option of running per-
petual primary deﬁcits. However, as noted by Flavin and Hamilton (1986),
equations (2)a n d( 3) do not necessarily exclude a permanent, conventionally
measured budget deﬁcit (i.e. one that is inclusive of interest payments). As
long as the deﬁcits are such that the debt stock grows at a rate that is less
than the rate of interest, equation (3) will be satisﬁed.3
G i v e ne q u a t i o n( 3), it follows that the inter-temporal budget constraint,
equation (2), can be written as;
G
∗






t + r∆Bt+s−1), (4)
where G∗
t is government expenditure (i.e., outlays plus interest payments on
the stock of debt carried over from the previous period).
The intertemporal budget constraint, under the no-Ponzi scheme rule,
imposes restrictions on the time series properties of government expenditure
and revenue. These follow from the speciﬁcation of the right hand side of
3Since the sustainability condition relates to the discounted value of the debt stock in
the limit, it is also possible for a deﬁcit equal to some constant value d in each period to
be sustainable. To see this, note from equation (1), that ∆Bt = d ∀ t. Therefore, the
stock of debt in period s will be Bs = B0+sd which implies that lims→∞(1+r)−sBs =0 .An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 5
equation (4). This will be stationary, as long as government expenditure,
revenue and the stock of debt are all stationary in ﬁrst diﬀerences. The
stationarity property restricts the extent to which G∗
t and Rt, can deviate
from each other over time. In particular, if G∗
t and Rt are I(1), they will
be cointegrated. Cointegration implies that there exists an error correction
mechanism pushing government ﬁnances towards the levels required by the
intertemporal budget constraint. In the absence of cointegration, the error
correction mechanism will not operate and there is no likelihood that equa-
tion (3) will hold. In these circumstances, we would conclude that under
unchanged ﬁscal policies, India’s debt stock is unsustainable.
3 Econometric Methodology
Following Hakkio and Rush (1991), sustainability of the debt stock can be
evaluating by estimating the regression
Rt = α + βG
∗
t + ²t, (5)
where 0 < β ≤ 1 and testing to see whether G∗
t and Rt form a cointegrating
relation.4 A necessary condition for the existence of cointegration is that the
individual series are integrated of order one. Should only one of the series be
4Non-violation of the budget constraint does not necessarily require that β =1 .H o w -
ever, should β < 1, government expenditure will always be larger than revenue. In the
limit, the undiscounted stock of bonds will reach inﬁnity which is likely to make the mar-
keting of the debt prohibitively diﬃcult (Hakkio and Rush 1991). Note that Quintos
(1995) deﬁnes a situation in which cointegration is rejected and 0 < β < 1 as weak form
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I(1), with the other being stationary, the two series will permanently diverge
and equation (3) will not hold.
Three separate tests for the order of integration are used in this paper.
These are the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test, the Kwiatowski, Phillips,
Schmidt and Shin (1992) test and the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. The
Dickey-Fuller and Zivot and Andrews tests have, as their null hypothesis,
that the dynamics of the respective series are characterised by a unit root.
They diﬀer, however, in that the Zivot and Andrews test makes allowance
for the possible existence of a one-oﬀ structural change under the alterna-
tive hypothesis. This is an attractive feature of the test since Perron (1989,
1997) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) have demonstrated that the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test has low power in the presence of a structural break. The
Zivot-Andrews test also has the advantage of not requiring the a priori spec-
iﬁcation of the possible timing of a structural break. It also allows a check
to be made as to whether there has been a signiﬁcant “regime shift” in the
data generating process for the ﬁscal variables. The Kwiatowski et. al. test,
on the other hand, is based on the null hypothesis of stationarity. There is
some Monte Carlo evidence that the Kwiatowski et. al. test is less aﬀected
by departures from normality in the residuals than unit root tests (Silvapulle
1993).
Cointegration requires that the residuals from equation (5) be stationary.
The standard way of testing whether this requirement is met by the data is
to use Engle and Granger’s (1987) procedure on the residuals from the coin-An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 7
tegrating regression. This involves estimating the autoregressive parameter
from the “second stage” regression, εt = ρεt−1+µ,w h e r eµ is a stationary er-
ror term. If |ρ| < 1, cointegration is not rejected.5 However, as with the unit
root tests, this procedure has low power in the presence of a structural break
or regime change. Therefore, as well as reporting the results from the Engle-
Granger procedure, cointegration is also tested using the technique devised
by Gregory and Hansen (1996). This procedure is a robust test for cointe-
gration even if there is a structural break or regime change at an unknown
date.6
4T h e D a t a
The data are taken from oﬃcial sources. Deﬁnitions and descriptions of the
various data manipulations are detailed in Appendix I. The period covered
ranges from 1951-52 (marking the beginning of India’s ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan) to
1997-98. Expenditure and revenue of the central government are measured,
respectively, by aggregate disbursements (current expenditure, capital out-
lays, loans and advances and interest payments), net of recovery of loans and
advances of the central government; and the sum of revenue receipts (includ-
ing external grants) plus non-debt capital receipts of the central government.
Accordingly, the ﬁscal deﬁcit measure includes the central government’s loans
5It is important that correct critical values are used. These have been tabulated by
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
6Our use of the Gregory-Hansen procedure extends the work and Tanner and Liu (1994)
who allowed for a level-shift in the cointegrated relationship between U.S. Revenue and
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and grants to the states on the expenditure side, and its receipt of interest
and loan repayments from the states on the revenue side.7 The implicit GDP
deﬂator is used to convert the series into real terms. The data are presented
in Figure 1.
5R e s u l t s
The results from the unit root and stationarity tests are detailed in Table 1.
The lag length used to whiten the residuals for the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test, is chosen on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion
(BIC). The regression features a constant term and a linear trend. For both
revenue and expenditure, the ADF tests are consistent with the existence of a
unit root. This result is conﬁrmed by the KPSS tests. Two sets of KPSS test
statistics are shown, one featuring only a constant term in the deterministic
component (µ), the other augmenting this with a linear trend (τ). The tests
statistics are shown for four alternative lag lengths used in the window to
estimate the long-run variance. In all cases, the KPSS test statistics exceed
the respective critical values, thus rejecting stationarity. Table 1 also reports
the results from the Zivot-Andrews tests. Three alternative Zivot-Andrews
tests statistics are shown; model (A) allows for an exogenous change in the
level of the series, model (B) allows for an exogenous change in the growth
rate and model (C) allows there to be an exogenous change in both the
level and the rate of growth. In no case is there a test statistic that is less
7The gross ﬁscal deﬁcit of the central government is calculated as the excess of expen-
diture over receipts (as deﬁned above) - see Appendix I for details.An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 9
than the critical value. Therefore, we conclude that both the expenditure and
revenue data exhibit behaviour consistent with unit root non-stationarity. As
a result, it is possible that the series are cointegrated, as would be required
for sustainability.
The results from the cointegration tests are shown in table 2. The results
from the Engle-Granger two-step procedure shows that the residuals from
equation (5) are not consistent with expenditure and revenue forming a coin-
tegrating relation. As discussed in section 2, this implies non-sustainability
in the sense that equation (3) will not hold. The failure to ﬁnd cointegra-
tion is conﬁrmed by the results from the Gregory-Hansen procedure. Three
diﬀerent Gregory-Hansen test statistics are shown. Model (A) allows there
to have been a level shift in the cointegrating relation, Model (B) augments
model (A) with a trend in the cointegrating relation while model (C) allows
for a regime shift (i.e., for the value of the cointegrating parameter to have
changed). All three test results fail to reject the no cointegration null. We
conclude, therefore, that an unchanged pattern of conduct of Indian ﬁscal
policy is not sustainable, even when allowing for the possibility of a change
in the relationship between revenue and expenditure over time.8
8This result is consistent with previous work which has examined the sustainability
of India’s ﬁscal imbalances, ﬁnding that India’s discounted debt is a nonstationary series
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6C o n c l u s i o n
The results in this paper support the proposition that the indeﬁnite continu-
ation of the current stance of Indian ﬁscal policy is unsustainable, and needs
to be altered to prevent an adverse response from lenders. This conclusion is
based on a time series analysis of the behaviour of Indian government revenue
and expenditure data which indicates that adherence to the intertemporal
budget constraint (in the absence of Ponzi ﬁnancing) has not characterised
Indian ﬁscal policy. These results provide support for the moves towards
ﬁscal consolidation which occurred since the early 1990s. However, it is im-
portant to note that the reforms are unlikely to have led to a sustainable path
for the debt stock. This is despite the fact that the size of the budget deﬁcit
as a proportion of GDP has fallen since 1991. Following the reforms, deﬁcits
have been ﬁnanced through borrowings in a relatively less regulated ﬁnan-
cial market. As domestic markets have been liberalised, the cost of domestic
borrowing has increased and concessional external ﬁnancing has become a
smaller proportion of total borrowing. This has led to a major increase in
interest liabilities and to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Further ﬁs-
cal consolidation may well be required if Indian public ﬁnances are to be
consistent with debt sustainability.An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 11
APPENDIX I
All data have been derived from oﬃcial sources, and are annual in fre-
quency. It should be noted that they are for ﬁnancial years ending March
31; for example, 1994-95 refers to the year ending March 31, 1995.
Central Government’s Revenue (CENREV): the sum of revenue receipts
(including external grants) plus nondebt capital receipts of the central gov-
ernment (Government of India, GOI), in billions of rupees (Rs. crore), taken
from Budgetary Position of GOI, Revenue Receipts of GOI and Capital Re-
ceipts of GOI tables of the Reserve Bank of India (1998) and International
Monetary Fund (1998).
Central Government Expenditure (CENEXP): aggregate disbursements
(revenue expenditure, capital outlays and loans and advances), net of recov-
ery of loans and advances of the central government, in billions of rupees
(Rs. crore), taken from Budgetary Position of GOI, Revenue Receipts of
GOI and Capital Receipts of GOI tables of the Reserve Bank of India (1998)
and International Monetary Fund (1998).
Central Government’s Gross Fiscal Deﬁcit (CENGFD): gross ﬁscal deﬁcit
of the central government, and is calculated as the excess of CENEXP over
CENREV. It is ﬁnanced by external borrowing and domestic borrowing,
where the latter comprises market borrowing (chieﬂy from publicly-owned
ﬁnancial institutions), treasury bills, changes in cash balances with the Re-
serve Bank of India, small savings schemes, and state provident funds.An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 12
GDP Deﬂator (GDPDEF) : the GDP deﬂator (base 1990-91=100), taken
from the International Monetary Fund (1998) and the Central Statistical
Organization (1996).”An Examination of the Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy 13
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Table 1















Note: ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test for the null hy-
pothesis of a unit root, with the lag length chosen according to the BIC
criterion. The 5% critical value is -3.450. KPSSi(µ) is the Kwiatowski et. al.
(1992) test for stationarity around a level where the lag length is set equal to
i. The 5% critical value is 0.463. KPSSi(τ) is the Kwiatowski et. al.(1992)
test for trend stationarity where the lag length is set equal to i.T h e 5 %
critical value is 0.146. ZAj, j = A,B,C are the Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests
for the null hypothesis of a unit root conditional on (A) an exogenous change
in the level of the series, (B) an exogenous change in the rate of growth and
(C), exogenous changes in both the level and the rate of growth. The 5%








Note: EG is the Engle-Granger (1987) test of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. The 5% critical value is —3.34. GHi, i = A,B,C are the
Gregory-Hansen (1996) tests for no cointegration conditional on (A) al e v e l
shift in the cointegrating relation, (B) a level shift with trend and (C) a




































































Figure 1: Central Government’s Expenditure, Revenue ( in 1990/91 billion
* 100 rupees) and the Budget Deﬁcit (% of GDP)
Source: Reserve Bank of India (1998).